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is too interesting and too important for our under- 
standing of policy consequences from realign- 
ments to leave the matter unresolved. 
PAUL ALLEN BECK 
University of Pittsburgh 
To THE EDITOR: 
I think Professor Beck's criticisms very well 
taken. Indeed, they reflect certain caveats which I 
myself noted in my article. While his reservations 
about the analysis are appropriate, however, the 
vigor with which he presses them suggests that he 
has, in part, missed the point of the essay. 
After three paragraphs which reasonably ac- 
curately summarize "The Supreme Court and 
Critical Elections," Professor Beck's central point 
(italicized, lest the unwary reader miss it) is made 
at the beginning of his fourth paragraph. I agree 
with that point. But I fail to see how it materially 
adds anything to what I wrote (p. 807): 
... The use here of some years before the elections 
which brought new coalitions to power as part of the 
realignment phases may very probably have artificially 
deflated the indexes for the critical periods.... Perhaps 
future research might attempt to determine the year of 
the ascendancy of the new coalition.... Such attempts 
to determine precise years of ascendancy, however, not 
only must contend with the scholarly contentiousness 
about which elections actually involved realignments but 
also will be liable to the charge that they have defined 
the critical periods so as to inflate the statistical results. 
... If the results reported here can be achieved by using 
realignment phases not inherently favorable to the thesis, 
they may perhaps be considered to be even more 
persuasive. 
As for Beck's remarks concerning the New Deal 
period, I would simply refer him to my footnote 
67. 
"The Supreme Court and Critical Elections" 
was intended-and, I think, can and should so be 
read-as a synthetic rather than an original 
analytic effort. It was an attempt, as I stated in 
several places, to both integrate and test the asser- 
tions of certain leaders in our profession-most 
notably Dahl, but also Burnham-on their own 
terms. This effort at replication was dictated by my 
belief that we social scientists too little attempt to 
build upon one another's work as do our brethren 
in the natural sciences. 
I could not more agree with Professor Beck that 
such an integrative statement as is represented by 
my article is but the beginning not the end of 
analysis, and I very much concur in his judgment 
that such an analysis must "examine the back- 
ground of each case individually." I said as much 
in the article (p. 808): 
Ultimately, the subject calls for an extended, system- 
atic, historical examination of the Court's decision 
making explicitly based upon the electoral classification 
scheme devised by the S.R.C. and elaborated by others, a 
treatment of the Court similar to that which Chambers 
and Burnham have done for the parties.... Any study 
such as this, based upon aggregate data, necessarily 
sacrifices situational focus for numerological standardi- 
zation, but Supreme Court decisions are not fungible 
goods. 
Indeed, my conception of what is required is ap- 
parently much more ambitious than Beck's; I 
think we need nothing less than a definitive in- 
tellectual history of the Court; something we do 
not now have. (See also my note 84.) I am en- 
couraged that someone with Professor Beck's 
analytic skills also thinks the pursuit important. 
RICHARD FUNSTON 
San Diego State University 
Alliance Behavior in Nineteenth-Century Europe 
To THE EDITOR: 
In their recent analysis of nineteenth-century 
European alliance activity, McGowan and Rood 
allude to two separate dimensions of alliance 
aggregation-spatial and temporal. "If these 
[Kaplan's] rules are violated, either by a rigid 
enmity, such as existed between France and Ger- 
many after the annexation of Alsace Lorraine 
[spatial], or by a decline in the system alliance 
formation rate [temporal], then a loss of system 
flexibility will result and system-changing events 
are likely."' 
Despite their repeated assertions that indepen- 
dence and flexibility in the matter of "whom the 
alliance partners are"2 are vital to the maintenance 
of a balance of power system and their quoting 
Kaplan in the same vein ("the 'balance of power' 
system postulates that any alignment is as prob- 
able as any other alignment prior to a considera- 
tion of the specific interests which divide nations. 
Moreover, any particular alignment should not 
predispose the same nations to align themselves 
with each other at the next opportunity"),3 the 
authors go on to ignore the spatial dimension of 
alliance aggregation in their data analysis. They 
test, instead, three hypotheses which concern the 
times at which alliances in nineteenth-century 
Europe were formed. These are 
Hi: in a balance of power international system, the 
occurrence of alliances will be stochastically dis- 
tributed (the number of alliances formed per unit 
of time is a Poisson random variable), and 
H2: in a balance of power international system, the 
time intervals between alliances are randomly 
distributed (the distribution of interalliance inter- 
vals is a negative exponential random variable).4 
'Patrick J. McGowan and Robert M. Rood, "Alliance 
Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a 
Poisson Model to Nineteenth-Century Europe," American 
Political Science Review, 69 (September 1975), 862. 
2 Ibid., p. 861. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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and 
H3: in a balance of power international system, a de- 
cline in the systemic rate of alliance formation 
precedes system changing events, such as general 
war.5 
Past scholarship, however, hardly agrees with 
McGowan and Rood that the time at which alli- 
ances are formed is the most important aspect of 
their relation to the operation of balance of power 
systems. Edward Gulick's account of European 
alliances is generally accepted as a classic account 
of the operation of a balance of power system 
(Robert Jervis's observation that Gulick's subject 
matter is more properly to be considered a "con- 
cert system" notwithstanding). In citing an ex- 
ample of the requisite (especially for the "holder 
of the balance") "mobility of action" for the main- 
tenance of a balance of power system,6 he empha- 
sizes the identities of allies and opponents at least 
as much as, if not indeed more than, the times at 
which the alliances were concluded. Richard 
Rosecrance argues that 
the balancing system of Europe required states to ally 
or oppose each other according to the presumed dis- 
tribution of power: if ideological bonds or animosities 
had arisen, states could no longer have charted their 
courses on power considerations alone; states would 
have refused to balance against their ideological confreres 
or to align themselves with ideological opponents, re- 
gardless of the configuration of power.7 
Dina Zinnes assumes the importance of spatial 
flexibility when she constructs her analytic model 
of a "hypothetical world" of possible alliance com- 
binations in such a way that "the labels of the 
nations are unimportant. The relevant factors are 
the number of alliances of various sizes and the 
placing and number of power equalities and in- 
equalities."8 Nicholas Spykman offers simply that 
"he who plays the balance of power can have no 
permanent friends. His devotion can be to no 
specific state but only to balanced power. The ally 
of today is the enemy of tomorrow. One of the 
charms of power politics is that it offers no op- 
portunity to grow weary of one's friends."9 
It seems likely, then, that if threats to a very 
polarized (spatially nonrandom) system occur 
randomly (or according to a Poisson distribution), 
causing alliance formation within the system, 
most students of the balance of power "theory" 
would say that the system itself is neither fluid 
nor flexible (i.e., it would be a rigid system re- 
sponding to random stimuli). On the other hand, a 
system of spatially random alliances would usually 
be considered fluid and flexible whether it was 
responding to random or nonrandom (temporally) 
stimuli. Therefore, the more important of the two 
dimensions of alliance aggregation would seem to 
be the spatial one. 
Although McGowan and Rood have given us an 
excellent analysis of the temporal randomness of 
nineteenth-century alliances in Europe, it would 
be far more interesting and important to know 
whether these same temporally Poisson-distrib- 
uted alliances exhibit spatial randomness as well. 
If they do, then McGowan and Rood's analysis 
(not to mention balance of power "theory" itself) 
would gain much more credibility. If, however, 
spatial alignment during the period is shown to be 
nonrandom-and more especially if the resulting 
pattern of alliance partners is indistinguishable 
from that of the 1910-1914 period's rigidity (which 
has been said to have been the cause of the dis- 
integration of the European balance of power sys- 
tem and its transformation to a more-or-less 
bipolar one), then not only might McGowan and 
Rood's analysis lose much of its credibility and 
theoretical usefulness but also the usefulness of 
structural theories for the study of international 
politics in general might be brought into ques- 
tion.10 
McGowan and Rood's data consist of 54 alli- 
ances among European states during the period 
1814-1909. Although other states occasionally are 
included in these alliances, most of the activity 
concerns only five states-Austria, France, Great 
Britain, Prussia, and Russia. Their alignments 
during the period can be summarized according to 
partners as follows: 
Aligned with 
State Prussia Russia France Great Britain other 
Austria 20 12 3 13 12 
Prussia 11 1 6 9 
Russia 7 9 3 
France 9 6 
Great Britain 10 
5 McGowan and Rood, p. 862. 
6 Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of 
Power (New York: Norton, 1967), p. 68. 
7 Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in 
World Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), p. 28. 
8 Dina A. Zinnes, "An Analytical Study of the Balance 
of Power Theories," Journal of Peace Research 4 (1967), 
273. 
'Nicholas Spykman, America's Strategy in World 
Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942), p. 103. 
10 Arthur L. Stinchcombe's ideas concerning theory 
testing should be apparent here, if only in some twisted 
form. See especially his Constructing Social Theories (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968). 
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From this table, the frequencies of bilateral rela- 
tions within the system can be seen. These can then 
be listed according to frequency (starting with the 
most frequently-found partnership): 
Austria-Prussia 20 
Austria-Great Britain 13 
Austria-Russia 12 
Prussia-Russia 11 
Russia-Great Britain 9 
France-Great Britain 9 
Russia-France 7 
Prussia-Great Britain 6 
Austria-France 3 
Prussia-France 1 
Since there are ten possible pairs of states in the 
data set, the probability that any one pair will 
occur, given that any one pair is just as likely as 
any other, is 1/10. Ninety-one bilateral ties occur 
in the matrix above. Therefore, an hypothesis of 
spatial randomness among the states under con- 
sideration would predict that each cell frequency 
would be 9.1. It is immediately apparent from 
both the matrix and the list presented above that 
this is not the case. The alliances which formed the 
McGowan-Rood data set are not spatially ran- 
dom. 
One finds instead that Austria is allied with 
Prussia more than twice as often as random distri- 
bution would predict. On the other hand, a 
Prussia-France alliance almost never occurs at all 
and an Austria-France one is very little more fre- 
quent. Only the Great Britain-Russia and France- 
Great Britain ties occur as frequently as balance 
of power "theory" would expect. 
If Austria-Prussia alliances predominated dur- 
ing the 1814-1909 period in Europe while Great 
Britain-Russia and France-Great Britain alliances 
occurred at least no less frequently than they 
would by chance, the modal alliance pattern for 
the system as a whole would seem very little dif- 
ferent from the pattern which obtained in 1914." 
Balance of power "theory" (and all structural 
theories of international politics) then faces the 
I If the grand coalitions which were formed just after 
the Congress of Vienna are dropped from the McGowan 
and Rood data set, then the general bipolarity of the 
European state system during the remainder of the nine- 
teenth century becomes considerably more evident. With 
an hypothesis of randomness expecting identical frequen- 
cies of 5.3 for each bilateral combination, the following 
frequencies are actually observed: 
Austria-Prussia 14 
France-Great Britain 7 
Austria-Russia 7 
Austria-Great Britain 7 
Russia-France 6 
Prussia-Russia 6 
Russia-Great Britain 4 
Prussia-Great Britain I 
Austria-France I 
Prussia-France 0 
question of why pre-1910 European alliance 
rigidity did not cause international system trans- 
formation whereas post- 1910 rigidity did. The only 
satisfactory answer to this question may have 
to be found at the individual-nation-as-actor level 
of analysis.'2 Although this is another matter de- 
serving further empirical research, it should be 
noted that Kaplan himself considered balance of 
power systems to be "subsystem dominant," 13 in 
other words, not amenable to systems (structural) 
theories and explanations at all: but rather de- 
pendent upon the actions and orientations of in- 
dividual states. 
Finally, an even more fundamental criticism can 
be made of both the McGowan and Rood analysis 
and this very brief one. Both analyses are in some 
fundamental sense after the fact of alliance, con- 
cerning themselves only with the point at which 
the "specific interests" of states have already 
shown themselves and the states in the system have 
taken up sides according to those interests. 
Kaplan's classic statement bears repeating: "the 
'balance of power' system postulates that any 
alignment is as probable as any other alignment 
prior to a consideration of the specific interests 
which divide nations (emphasis added)." By the 
time alliances form, it is too late to determine this 
probability. Any study which concerns itself 
solely with alliances which have already come into 
being cannot adequately address itself to the task 
of testing balance of power "theory." 
FRED H. LAWSON 
University of California, Los Angeles 
12 For a very precise delimitation of the two levels of in- 
ternational political analysis, see William B. Moul, "The 
Level of Analysis Problem Revisited," Canadian Journal 
of Political Science 6 (September 1973), 494-513. 
'" Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in Interna- 
tional Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 27, 125. 
To THE EDITOR: 
As we understand Mr. Lawson, he makes six 
points in his criticism of our recent study of bal- 
ance of power alliance behavior in nineteenth- 
century Europe: 
(1) the choice of alliance partner (and, by im- 
plication, opponent) is an important aspect of bal- 
ance of power theory; 
(2) we ignored this "spatial" dimension of alli- 
ance aggregation in our exclusively "temporal" 
study; 
(3) if alliance pairings among the five great 
European powers in the nineteenth century are ap- 
proximately random, then our analysis and bal- 
ance of power theory "would gain much more 
credibility," but if "spatial alignment . .. is . . 
nonrandom," then our study and other "structural 
theories" of international politics "might be 
brought into question"; 
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(4) according to his presentation of our data, 
alliances "are not spatially random"; 
(5) moreover, ex post facto research, such as our 
original study and his comment, cannot "test" 
balance of power theory; 
(6) therefore, our study and balance of power 
theories are of dubious value. 
We appreciate Mr. Lawson's interest in our 
paper and we welcome this opportunity to respond 
to his interpretation of our work and thereby to 
extend research in this important area of interna- 
tional relations theory. 
Before we discuss each issue Mr. Lawson has 
raised, two general comments are in order. First, 
although he cites Moul's fine paper,2 we do not 
think he has fully understood its relevance to his 
critique. The units of analysis and the treatment 
of time are completely different in our article and 
in his comment. We presented a longitudinal 
study of one international system, whereas Lawson 
works with a single aggregated cross-section of 
time (96 years!) and ten pairs of states. In Moul's 
language, for Lawson to claim that his critique 
says anything about the findings of our article is a 
clear instance of "confounding the ecological 
fallacy with a cross-sectional-longitudinal fal- 
lacy."' However, Lawson's presentation of our 
data is of interest in its own right, a point we shall 
consider. Second, Lawson has not reanalyzed our 
data, he has simply presented without citation and 
with several counting errors4 information reported 
four years ago in Table 7 and Appendix A of 
Rood's dissertation.5 
(1) Without question, at the levels of states and 
pairs of states, patterns of choice of alliance part- 
ner are a fundamental aspect of balance of power 
theory. However, to examine this issue in an en- 
tirely static, cross-sectional fashion as Lawson 
does obscures the dynamic, sequential nature of 
alignments, making it difficult to discuss in an in- 
telligent manner alliance flexibility and also mak- 
ing more probable a spatially skewed distribution 
of the behavior between pairs of states, or any 
other interacting units for that matter.6 
1 We made these data available to Mr. Lawson at his re- 
quest, a fact he fails to acknowledge. 
2 William B. Moul, "The Level of Analysis Problem Re- 
visited," Canadian Journal of Political Science 6 (Septem- 
ber, 1973), 494-513. 
3Ibid., pp. 501-502. 
4 The errors are: (1) our alliances number 55, not 54; (2) 
the Austria-Prussia pair has 21, not 20 alliances, and (3) 
the Austria-Great Britain pair has 12, not 13. These correct 
figures are used in the new analysis we report in this com- 
munication. 
5Robert M. Rood, "Agreement in the International 
System" (Ph.D. dissertation in Political Science, Syracuse 
University, 1973), 88, 183-201. 
6 Edwin Kuh, "The Validity of Cross-Sectionally Esti- 
mated Behavior Equations in Time Series Applications," 
Econometrica 27 (1959), 197-214. 
(2) It is obvious that we did not examine the 
dyadic level problem of alliance choice in our ex- 
clusively system level paper. It is also obvious 
that Mr. Lawson has not read carefully or has not 
understood fully our article and Rood's disserta- 
tion from which he obtained our data. To repeat 
what we said in our article,' Rood's study was an 
explicit test of the dyadic level proposition that 
"any alignment is as probable as any other align- 
ment prior to a consideration of the specific inter- 
ests which divide nations."8 Rood was unable to 
falsify this proposition when a probabilistic model 
of agreement among pairs of actors developed by 
Brams and O'Leary was applied to the data.9 
Moreover, subsequent research has shown that 
deviations from this model may be explained 
statistically by the magnitude of war within each 
pair of states,'0 a violation of its assumptions that 
balance-of-power theory predictions should affect 
choice of alliance partners and opponents." 1 
(3) We strongly agree that if it can be demon- 
strated that alliances occur on both a spatially and 
temporarily random basis, then our study and 
balance-of-power theory will have their credibility 
enhanced. The problem with Lawson's critique is 
that skewed cross-sectional data are not necessarily 
evidence of nonrandomness in statistical models, 
particularly (a) when one works with a simplistic 
probability model, equal probability, (b) when the 
N is small, only ten dyads, and (c) when the author 
merely "eyeballs" the data rather than applying 
the appropriate statistical goodness of fit test. 
Lawson, in his "analysis" of our data, makes the 
same mistake Londoners did during World War 
II when they were sure that German rocket bombs 
fell in clusters in certain neighborhoods. A Pois- 
son-based analysis of the spatial distribution of 
south London bomb hits indicated perfect ran- 
domness.12 We would advise Mr. Lawson to heed 
Feller's conclusion regarding "the established fact 
that to the untrained eye randomness appears as 
7 Patrick J. McGowan and Robert M. Rood, "Alliance 
Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a 
Poisson Model to Nineteenth-Century Europe," American 
Political Science Review 69 (September, 1975), 863. 
8 Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in Interna- 
tional Politics (New York: Wiley Science Editions, 1964), 
Preface. 
9 Rood, "Agreement in the International System," pp. 
159-163; Steven J. Brams and Michael K. O'Leary, "An 
Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies," American Political 
Science Review 64 (June, 1970), 449-470. 
10 Robert M. Rood, "The Dyadic Distribution of Al- 
liance Commitments," Columbia: Department of Govern- 
ment and International Studies, University of South 
Carolina, mimeo, 1975. 
' That is, the patterned relationships of international 
conflict (magnitude of war within dyads) certainly are 
"specific interests which divide nations." 
12 William Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory 
and Its Applications, 3rd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1968), 
160-161. 
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regularity or tendency to cluster."'3 
(4) In point of fact, alliance choice is randomly 
distributed in the five power nineteenth-century 
European balance of power system. Table 1 shows 
this when the spatial t-axis is defined in terms of 
pairs of states and grouped in units of four alli- 
ances. We have also calculated goodness-of-fit tests 
for cutting points of two and three alliance units 
with similar results. Substantively, contrary to 
Lawson's reading of our data, we can report that 
the hypothesis, in a balaace-oJ- power system, pair- 
wise choice of alliance partner will be stochastically 
distributed (the number of alliances formed per 
dyad is a Poisson random variable), cannot be re- 
jected and is independent of how the number of 
alliances is categorized. Methodologically, Table 
1 is cross-sectional (spatial) with all the attendant 
Table 1. The Pair-wise Choice of Alliance Partners in 
Europe, 1814-1914, as a Poisson Distribution 
Number of 
alliances Number Number 
per dyad pa Observed Expected 
0-3 .0198 2 .2 
4-7 .2924 2 2.9 
8-11 .4709 3 4.7 
? 12 .2068 3 2.1 
10 9.9 
X2= 4.48, d.f.=3, p=.21 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov testb, p> .20 
a Calculated from T. Kitagawa, Tables of the Poisson 
Distribution (Tokyo: Baifukan, 1952). 
b Calculated from Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric Sta- 
tisticsjor the Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGraw- 
Hill, 1956), pp. 47-51. 
13 Feller, Probability Theory, p. 161. 
problems we have discussed regarding such 
analyses, and the N is very small. Nevertheless, we 
appreciate Mr. Lawson's stimulus and we hope 
that this original demonstration of the spatial 
randomness of alliances leads him to find more 
credible our original study as well as balance of 
power theory and structural theories of interna- 
tional politics in general. 
(5) It is difficult to determine what Mr. Lawson 
means by his concluding criticism that balance of 
power theory cannot be "tested" by nonexperi- 
mental methods including historical research and 
quantitative international political analysis. If he 
is correct, then the "theory" is no more empirical 
than the statement "everything which happens is 
God's will." We think Professor Kaplan intends 
to say more than such truisms and that in making 
statements about possible alliance partners and 
opponents, one must include the specific interests 
which divide nations as part of the statement of 
initial conditions from which the explanation 
(postdiction) or prediction is deduced. Could 
Kaplan mean anything else by his "classic state- 
ment" and still claim to advocate a "scientific" 
approach to the study of international relations 
as he so often does?'4 
(6) For all of these reasons, including his 
changes in the level of analysis and temporal or- 
ganization, we cannot accept Mr. Lawson's 
criticisms. We do, however, thank him for his in- 
terest in our work. 
PATRICK J. MCGOWAN 
University of Southern California 
ROBERT M. ROOD 
University of South Carolina 
14 Morton A. Kaplan, "The New Great Debate: Tra- 
ditionalism vs. Science in International Relations," in 
K. Knorr and J. N. Rosenau, eds., Contending Approaches 
to International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1969), pp. 38-61. 
